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I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines adopted in the United States in 1987 
and rendered advisory by the Supreme Court’s decision in 2005 in United States 
v. Booker1 have been the subject of a wide variety of criticisms over the past 
twenty-five years. But no specific aspects of the Guidelines have been more 
controversial than the treatment of offenders who possess or distribute cocaine 
and the treatment of offenders who download or transmit child pornography. 
The cocaine Guidelines have been controversial in part because of their 
harshness (resulting from Guidelines ranges scaled around separately enacted 
mandatory minimum penalties), but mostly because of the infamous “100-to-1” 
crack–powder disparity, in which crack cocaine triggered weight-based penalties 
that required 100 times as much powder cocaine to trigger, resulting in 
substantial racial disparities in cocaine sentencing. The child pornography 
Guidelines have been controversial because of the steep escalation of 
applicable penalties over a relatively brief period of time through direct 
intervention by Congress, coupled with the failure of the Guidelines to 
distinguish adequately between the most culpable offenders (that is, 
commercial producers and distributors of child pornography, or those who 
actually sexually entice or assault children) and less culpable offenders (that is, 
downloaders and file sharers who have no history of sexual activity with 
children). In each of these two contexts, the relevant Guidelines have drawn 
fire from a variety of critics who have spanned the bench, the bar, the academy, 
the U.S. Sentencing Commission itself, and even the political sphere. Despite 
the frequent and vociferous criticisms aimed at them, the cocaine and child 
pornography Guidelines have proven remarkably resistant to change. The stark 
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disparity between the treatment of crack and powder cocaine under the 
Guidelines was eventually ameliorated (though not eliminated) by formal 
revisions from both the Sentencing Commission and Congress, but only after a 
long and tortuous process. The child pornography Guidelines have not been 
formally revised, though some federal courts recently have taken 
unprecedented steps to reject them pursuant to their post-Booker license to 
treat the Guidelines as advisory rather than mandatory. 
It is worth examining in some detail the histories of these two much-
maligned aspects of the Guidelines in order to understand how the features that 
have invited so much criticism came into being, why they were so controversial, 
why they proved so resistant to change, and how (some) change nonetheless 
occurred. This account may prove helpful to countries like Israel as they 
consider establishing their own regimes of guided sentencing—even if only as a 
negative model or cautionary tale. In order to make the tale worth the telling, 
however, I will try to tease apart which strands of the story reflect distinctive 
aspects of American politics, law, or institutional structures, on the one hand, 
and which reflect challenges inherent in the project of guiding sentencing 
discretion, on the other. Moreover, I will try not only to criticize and draw 
negative lessons from these accounts of controversy, but also to propose some 
positive lessons for the general structure of guidelines regimes. 
II 
TWO FAILURES 
The cocaine and child pornography Guidelines could be deemed “failures” 
based solely on the unprecedented amount and degree of criticism that they 
have received. However, this criticism is better viewed as a symptom of deeper 
failures. These aspects of the Guidelines have drawn such intense criticism 
because they represent failures on both an internal and a normative level. On a 
level internal to the Guidelines themselves, the cocaine and child pornography 
Guidelines have failed to promote the sentencing goals set forth in the 
Guidelines and codified by Congress in Section 3553 of the federal criminal 
code.2 These statutory goals themselves reflect a commitment to “just 
punishment”3—an external normative commitment that the Guidelines at issue 
have likewise failed to meet. These internal and normative failures have been 
compounded by their resistance to amelioration, even in the face of significant 
and well-reasoned criticism. 
A.  Cocaine 
The best accounts of the history of the treatment of cocaine under the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines have been produced by the Sentencing 
Commission itself. The Commission has prepared four reports over the years on 
 
 2.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006). 
 3.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
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“Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy,” the most recent and comprehensive 
of which was published in 2007.4 As the Commission explains, the story starts 
even before the Guidelines went into effect in 1987, with the passage of a 
separate piece of legislation called the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.5 In this 
Act, Congress established two tiers of penalties for cocaine trafficking (five- 
and ten-year mandatory minimum sentences, depending on the amount of drugs 
trafficked), but differentiated between cocaine in its powder form and “crack” 
cocaine, a commonly consumed form of cocaine base that can be manufactured 
from powder cocaine by heating the powder and baking soda in water.6 Under 
the 1986 Act, it took five grams of crack cocaine, but 500 grams of powder 
cocaine, to trigger the five-year penalty, and 50 grams of crack, but 5,000 grams 
of powder, to trigger the ten-year penalty.7 The Guidelines for cocaine 
sentencing were based on the structure of the 1986 Act. Rather than generating 
Guidelines using data on past sentencing practices (as the Sentencing 
Commission did for most other offenses), the Commission anchored base 
offense levels for the full range of cocaine offenses around the mandatory 
minimum triggers, using the same weight-based formula as the 1986 Act, and 
maintaining the same 100-to-1 ratio between powder and crack cocaine. In 
1988, Congress enacted another Anti-Drug Abuse Act8 that further 
distinguished crack cocaine from both powder cocaine and other drugs by 
mandating that mere possession of five grams of crack would trigger the same 
five-year mandatory minimum penalty as trafficking9—the only federally 
mandated minimum penalty for a first offense of simple possession of a 
controlled substance.10 
The sharp distinction between powder and crack cocaine and the draconian 
treatment of the latter were motivated by concerns about the special dangers 
that appeared to be associated with the widespread introduction of crack 
 
 4.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (2007) [hereinafter 2007 COCAINE REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/200705_RtC_Co
caine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND 
FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (2002) [hereinafter 2002 COCAINE REPORT], available at 
http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_To
pics/200205_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/200205_Cocaine_and_Federal_Sentencing_Policy.pdf; 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY (1997) [hereinafter 1997 COCAINE REPORT], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_Topics/19970429_RtC_
Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy.pdf; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: 
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995) [hereinafter 1995 COCAINE REPORT], available 
at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Drug_ 
Topics/199502_RtC_Cocaine_Sentencing_Policy/index.htm.  
 5.  Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
 6.  1995 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 4, at iv, vi. 
 7.  Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1002, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-2 to 3. 
 8.  Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988). 
 9.  Id. § 6371. 
 10.  See 1995 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 4, at v. 
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cocaine into American markets in the 1980s. In particular, congressional and 
public concerns focused on the violence associated with the crack trade, the 
greater use of women and young people to facilitate distribution, the increased 
incidence of infants exposed to cocaine in utero, the increase in maternal 
neglect of infants and children due to maternal drug addiction, and the 
generally increased risk of addiction from crack, due to its lower cost and its 
quicker and more-intense high.11 The “devastating changes” that drug addiction 
and high rates of violent crime wrought in the 1980s became linked in the public 
mind to the proliferation of crack cocaine,12 and this association drove the 
statutory differentiation between crack and powder (and between crack and 
other controlled substances). 
However, by the early 1990s, both the majority of the Sentencing 
Commission and some members of Congress realized that the panicked public 
reaction to crack cocaine in the 1980s had led to the creation of a sentencing 
structure that was too rigid and not empirically supported. The first proposed 
bill to reduce the crack–powder disparity was introduced (to no avail) in 
Congress in 1993,13 and similar bills followed (also unsuccessfully) almost every 
year until 2010,14 when the Fair Sentencing Act was finally passed, which 
reduced but did not eliminate the disparity.15 Although members of Congress 
concerned about the crack–powder disparity could not muster congressional 
will to amend it for nearly two decades, they did manage to pass directives to 
the Sentencing Commission to study and report back to Congress on the 
disparity. In the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,16 
Congress passed the first such directive to the Commission to “report on the 
current federal structure of differing penalties for powder cocaine and crack 
cocaine offenses and to provide recommendations for retention or modification 
of these differences.”17 
In the Commission’s 1995 Special Report to Congress, it recommended both 
that the Commission propose amendments to the Guidelines to address the 
crack–powder disparity and that Congress revisit its statutory 100-to-1 ratio and 
its mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession of crack in light of the 
new Guidelines that would be forthcoming.18 The Commission based its 
recommendations on the fact that the rigid 100-to-1 quantity ratio failed to 
account for the relationship between powder and crack cocaine in the 
distribution chain: individual retail dealers of crack at the street level were 
 
 11.  Id. at xiii–xiv. 
 12.  Id. at xiii. 
 13.  Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 1993, H.R. 3277, 103d Cong. (1993). 
 14.  See Kyle Graham, Sorry Seems to be the Hardest Word: The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 
Crack, and Methamphetamine, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 765, 767 (2011) (listing the numerous proposed bills 
to reduce the crack–powder disparity that failed between 1993 and 2010). 
 15.  Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010); see infra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
 16.  Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994). 
 17.  1995 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 4, at iii. 
 18.  Id. at iv. 
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punished far more severely than powder cocaine suppliers who sold the powder 
from which multiple street dealers made crack.19 Moreover, these 
disproportionate sentences led to large racial disparities in the treatment of 
cocaine offenders, given the substantial racial divide between those convicted of 
crack and those convicted of powder cocaine offenses.20 The Commission 
acknowledged that crack cocaine was associated with increased harms (such as 
increased violence and youth and gang involvement), but felt that these harms 
could be better addressed by sentencing enhancements targeted to specific 
harms, rather than by automatic ratios and mandatory minimum sentences.21 
As promised, the Commission followed its 1995 report with proposed 
amendments to the Guidelines a few months later. By a 4-to-3 vote, the 
Commission proposed changes that would have made the starting point for 
determining sentences for powder and crack offenders the same by adopting a 
1-to-1 quantity ratio at the sentencing level then in place for powder cocaine, 
while providing sentencing enhancements for violence and other harms 
disproportionately associated with crack cocaine.22 The minority dissented on 
the ground that the difference in general harms associated with the two forms of 
cocaine did not warrant the total elimination of a differential between base 
sentences, even with the possibility of enhancements for specific harms. 
Congress passed legislation rejecting the amendments proposed by the 
Commission,23 but directing the Commission to offer new recommendations that 
reflected Congress’s agreement with the minority view on the Commission that 
“the sentence imposed for trafficking in a quantity of crack cocaine should 
generally exceed the sentence imposed for trafficking in a like quantity of 
powder cocaine.”24 
In 1997, the Commission complied with the congressional directive and 
made new recommendations, urging that the 100-to-1 ratio be reduced to a 5-to-
1 ratio and (again) that the mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession 
of crack be eliminated.25 This time, the Commission was unanimous in its 
recommendations. The 1997 report reiterated that the 100-to-1 ratio failed to 
distinguish between street-level dealers and mid-level or serious traffickers. The 
 
 19.  Id. at xii–xiii. 
 20.  Blacks accounted for 88.3% of federal crack cocaine distribution convictions in 1993, while 
whites accounted for only 4.1% (and Hispanics for 7.1%). For powder cocaine distribution, blacks 
accounted for 27.4% of convictions, while whites accounted for 32% (and Hispanics for 39.3%). Id. at 
xi. 
 21.  Id. at xii. 
 22.  See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074 
(May 10, 1995). 
 23.  This was the first time that Congress rejected a proposed amendment by the Sentencing 
Commission. See Albert W. Alschuler, Disparity: The Normative and Empirical Failure of the Federal 
Guidelines, 58 STAN. L. REV. 85, 104 (2005). 
 24.  1997 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. 
 25.  This reduction would be achieved by reducing the trigger for the five-year mandatory 
minimum sentence for powder cocaine from 500 grams to between 125 and 375 grams, and increasing 
the trigger for crack from five grams to between 25 and 75 grams. Id. at 9.  
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Commission collected new data between 1995 and 1997 that supported its 
conclusion that “the five-gram trigger for crack cocaine is over inclusive.”26 In 
addition to recommending an increase in the five-gram trigger for crack, the 
Commission also recommended a decrease in the weight trigger for powder 
cocaine, because of “the ease with which powder cocaine is converted to crack 
cocaine.”27 The Commission also strongly urged that “less reliance [be] put on 
drug quantity”28 in the penalty structure for cocaine, and more on specific 
aggravating factors, such as the use of a dangerous weapon, the use of juveniles 
to traffick cocaine, the defendant’s prior drug trafficking convictions, and the 
defendant’s role in the offense. These changes, argued the Commission, would 
direct limited federal resources toward the most serious offenders and would 
promote public perceptions of sentencing fairness by reducing the racial 
disparities wrought by the 100-to-1 ratio.29 
Congress neither acted on the Commission’s recommendations nor asked 
the Commission for any further consideration of the structure of cocaine 
penalties. Nonetheless, the Commission prepared another much longer and 
more comprehensive report to Congress in 2002, after holding three public 
hearings. In this report, the Commission recommended that Congress increase 
the weight trigger for crack “at least” enough to reduce the disparity from 100-
to-1 to 20-to-1, but without reducing the weight trigger for powder cocaine (that 
is, without raising the penalties for powder cocaine).30 The Commission also 
again recommended specific sentencing enhancements and called for repeal of 
the mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession of crack.31 In explaining 
its recommendations, the Commission drew on new data as well as the 
testimony offered at its public hearings to support its specific findings that 
“current penalties exaggerate the relative harmfulness of crack cocaine,” that 
“current penalties sweep too broadly and apply most often to lower level 
offenders,” that “current penalties overstate the seriousness of most crack 
cocaine offenses and fail to provide adequate proportionality,” and that 
“current penalties’ severity mostly impacts minorities.”32 For example, the 
Commission explained how medical data debunked the myth of “an epidemic of 
‘crack baby syndrome’”33 by finding significantly less-severe negative effects of 
prenatal cocaine exposure than had previously been feared. Similarly, the 
Commission concluded that congressional concerns about an “epidemic of 
crack cocaine use by youth” also never materialized to the extent feared.34 The 
same was true with regard to congressional concerns about violence: “More 
 
 26.  Id. at 5. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 6. 
 29.  See id. at 6–8. 
 30.  2002 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 4, at 104. 
 31.  See id. at 108–09. 
 32.  See id. at 93–111 (capitalizations removed). 
 33.  Id. at 94 (the internal quotation marks are the Commission’s own). 
 34.  Id. at 96. 
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recent data indicate that significantly less trafficking-related violence or 
systemic violence, as measured by weapon use and bodily injury documented in 
presentence reports, is associated with crack cocaine trafficking offenses than 
previously assumed.”35 On the question of disparate race effects, the 
Commission noted that data was not available on the question of whether black 
crack traffickers were disproportionately prosecuted in federal courts, but it did 
acknowledge that the effects of the unduly severe federal sentencing scheme for 
crack offenses fell primarily upon black offenders and led to a “widely-held 
perception that the current penalty structure . . . promotes unwarranted 
disparity based on race.”36 
Once again, Congress failed to respond (though unsuccessful bills continued 
to be introduced). Finally, in 2007, the Commission took the more aggressive 
step of not only urging Congress to amend the 100-to-1 ratio, but also adopting 
a change in the Guidelines. The Commission recognized that congressional 
action was needed to fully address the 100-to-1 ratio and to repeal the 
mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession of crack, but the 
Commission described the problems associated with the 100-to-1 ratio as “so 
urgent and compelling” that immediate action by the Commission was 
necessary “to somewhat alleviate” those problems.37 Unlike the Commission’s 
previously rejected amendments in 1995, the 2007 amendments did not directly 
address the drug quantity ratio. Rather, the amendments adjusted downward by 
two base offense levels the Guidelines ranges for crack offenses without 
changing the base offense levels for powder cocaine, a change that somewhat 
reduced the disparity caused by the weight ratio.38 The Commission described 
its amendment as “only . . . a partial remedy,” noting that “[a]ny comprehensive 
solution requires appropriate legislative action by Congress.”39 This time, 
Congress did not reject the Commission’s amendments, which went into effect 
on November 1, 2007. 
Only one month later, the Supreme Court joined the fray by issuing its 
decision in Kimbrough v. United States.40 The Court held that, in the post-
Booker era in which the Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, federal 
sentencing courts are free to deviate from the Guidelines based on their general 
disagreement with the crack-to-powder ratio (though they are still bound by the 
statutory mandatory minimum penalties). Relying heavily on the Commission’s 
reports documenting the problems with the 100-to-1 ratio and its largely 
unsuccessful efforts to reduce the disparity (other than the “modest” 2007 
 
 35.  Id. at 100. 
 36.  Id. at 103. 
 37.  2007 COCAINE REPORT, supra note 4, at 9. 
 38.  Id. at Appendix E-21 (showing that the proposed crack cocaine amendment would affect 
69.7% of crack cases and yield an average sentence reduction of 12.4%). The amendment’s change in 
the crack-to-powder ratio varies (at different offense levels) between 25-to-1 and 80-to-1. See 
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 72 Fed. Reg. 28571–72 (May 21, 2007). 
 39.  Id. at 10. 
 40.  552 U.S. 85 (2007). 
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amendment),41 the Court held that the crack cocaine Guidelines “do not 
exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic institutional role”42 and 
thus are not entitled to the same kind of deference as more empirically 
grounded Guidelines in appellate “reasonableness” review of federal 
sentencing. 
While Kimbrough permitted (but did not require) federal sentencing courts 
to reject the crack–powder disparity in individual sentencing decisions, the most 
powerful judicial check on congressional and executive power—constitutional 
review—remained dormant. The problems identified by the Commission and 
other critics of the crack–powder disparity gave rise to two possible 
constitutional challenges. First, the disparity could be challenged as inconsistent 
with the promise of “equal protection” inherent in the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. Second, individual crack sentences could be challenged 
as disproportionate punishment under the proscription of “cruel and unusual 
punishments” in the Eighth Amendment. However, the prevailing structure of 
“equal protection” and “proportionality” doctrine rendered each of these 
potential challenges essentially non-starters. Equal protection doctrine requires 
that legislation have only a “rational basis” (an extremely low bar) unless 
purposeful discrimination against a protected group is proven.43 As the Court 
explained in rejecting an equal protection challenge to racially disparate capital 
sentencing outcomes in Georgia, a facially neutral statute qualifies for 
heightened constitutional scrutiny only if it was “enacted or maintained . . . 
because of an anticipated racially discriminatory effect.”44 The case for 
purposeful discrimination in the formulation or preservation of the cocaine 
Guidelines is weak precisely because of the real differences (exaggerated 
though they were) that Congress found and that the Commission also 
recognized between crack and powder. Not surprisingly, despite a large number 
of equal protection challenges brought against the federal cocaine guidelines, 
“the defendants always have lost, and the opinions generally have been both 
unanimous and short.”45 
Proportionality challenges have fared little better. In 1991, the Supreme 
Court upheld against a proportionality challenge a state sentence of life without 
possibility of parole for a first offense of possession of more than 650 grams of 
cocaine.46 Explaining that the Eighth Amendment’s proscription of “cruel and 
 
 41.  Id. at 100. 
 42.  Id. at 109. 
 43.  See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 517–21 (2d 
ed. 2002).  
 44.  McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987). 
 45.  David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1303 (1995); 
see also Jamie Fellner, Race, Drugs, and Law Enforcement in the United States, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 257, 279 n.90 (2009) (collecting equal protection challenges to the crack–powder disparity 
rejected because of plaintiffs’ inability to establish discriminatory intent). 
 46.  Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
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unusual punishments” encompasses only “a narrow proportionality principle”47 
in non-capital cases, the plurality opinion stressed that great deference should 
be shown to legislative choices and that courts should not compare the 
challenged sentence to sentences for other crimes within the same jurisdiction, 
or to sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions, unless the challenged 
sentence gives rise on its face to an inference of “gross disproportionality.”48 
Because courts were reluctant to hold that crack sentences were grossly 
disproportionate on their face to the harms caused by the crack trade, they were 
prevented by the structure of the Court’s proportionality doctrine from even 
considering the distinctiveness of the harsh federal sentences for crack, not only 
in comparison to powder cocaine, but also in comparison to other drugs (and 
even other serious violent offenses) at both the federal and state level.49 
Despite the judicial rejection of constitutional remedies for the crack–
powder disparity, the Kimbrough Court’s authorization of a discretionary 
judicial remedy in individual sentencing proceedings may well have galvanized, 
at last, congressional action to reduce the disparity in 2010. The decision in 
Kimbrough, which permitted but did not require courts to reject the Guidelines’ 
100-to-1 ratio, was a recipe for the return of the very unwarranted sentencing 
disparities that the Guidelines had been created to address, as some judges 
continued to support the 100-to-1 ratio, while others reduced it by varying 
amounts.50 Although Congress resisted the Commission’s prodding to address 
the ratio, one commentator presciently asked, “Will Kimbrough, and the 
sentencing muddle it may create, be the straw that breaks Congress’ back?”51 
During the 2007–2008 legislative session, six crack cocaine reform bills were 
introduced52—one of them co-sponsored by then-Senator Barack Obama, 
already well on his way to his successful 2008 presidential bid.53 That a 
presidential candidate could take a strong position in favor of reducing the 
crack–powder disparity was a sign of the times: after more than a decade of 
steeply falling violent crime rates, it was no longer unthinkable to support 
reduction or even elimination (as the Obama-sponsored bill did) of the crack–
 
 47.  Id. at 997 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 48.  Id. at 1005 (emphasis added). 
 49.  See Sklansky, supra note 45, at 1304 (“Without exception, the [federal] courts of appeals have 
rejected arguments that the sentences [for crack] constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation 
of the Eighth Amendment.”); see also id. at 1304 n.102 (citing cases).  
 50.  One federal appellate judge noted the different approaches taken by two trial judges in the 
same federal district: “[O]ne active judge uses a 1:1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine when 
sentencing violators of crack cocaine laws while the other follows the sentencing guidelines—which 
here applied a 33:1 ratio.” United States v. Brewer, 624 F.3d 900, 910 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bright, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 51.  Michael B. Cassidy, Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough World, 42 
AKRON L. REV. 105, 132 (2009). 
 52.  See id. at 133 n.231 (listing proposed bills and describing their key provisions). 
 53.  See Alan Vinegrad & Douglas Bloom, The Presidential Candidates: Views on Sentencing, N.Y. 
L.J., Aug. 6, 2008, at 1.  
02_STEIKER_BP (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2013  5:49 PM 
36 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 76:27 
powder disparity and to urge Congress to be “smarter” rather than tougher on 
crime.54 
Consequently, there was fanfare, but not much surprise, when Congress 
finally passed and President Obama signed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010.55 
The Act did not go as far as the unsuccessful bill proposed by Obama in 2007, 
but it did reduce the crack-to-powder ratio from 100-to-1 to 18-to-1,56 and it also 
finally eliminated the mandatory minimum penalty for simple possession of 
crack that had been passed 22 years previously.57 Although the Commission 
voted that its own amendments (those of 2007 and those implementing the Fair 
Sentencing Act of 2010) would apply retroactively, only Congress had the 
power to make the 2010 Act itself retroactive, and the federal courts of appeals 
initially disagreed about whether Congress intended to do so.58 On the one 
hand, the Act was silent on the subject of retroactivity, which would ordinarily 
mandate non-retroactivity. One the other hand, Congress clearly intended—
because it directed—immediate action by the Commission to amend the 
Guidelines, and thus it would seem inconsistent for Congress to have intended 
immediate application of the new 18-to-1 ratio in Guidelines-based sentencing 
but adherence to the old 100-to-1 ratio in sentencing pursuant to statutory 
mandatory minimums. One appellate judge, writing for a majority of the 
Seventh Circuit, rejected retroactive application of Act on the ground that 
Congressional silence may well have reflected a political “compromise” about 
the scope of the effect of the Act,59 while another judge called such a result 
“gratuitously silly.”60 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict among the 
circuits in June of 2012.61  In a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that Congress 
intended the Fair Sentencing Act’s provisions to  apply to those whose criminal 
conduct occurred before the effective date of the Act but whose sentencing 
occurred after that date, basing its analysis “primarily upon the fact that a 
contrary determination would seriously undermine basic Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines objectives such as uniformity and proportionality in sentencing.”62 
 
 54.  Id. (quoting Obama campaign material stating that, upon election, Obama would review 
mandatory minimum sentences “to see where we can be smarter on crime and reduce the ineffective 
warehousing of non-violent drug offenders”).  
 55.  Pub L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
 56.  Id. § 2. 
 57.  Id. § 3. 
 58.  Compare United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011) (holding Act non-retroactive), 
with United States v. Douglas, 644 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2011), and United States v. Rojas, 645 F.3d 1234, 
(11th Cir. 2011) (holding Act retroactively applicable to those sentenced after the Act’s effective date, 
even though their offenses were committed before that date). 
 59.  United States v. Holcomb, 657 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 2011) (rejecting en banc review of four 
retroactivity cases, despite the change in position on the issue by the U.S. Attorney General). 
 60.  Id. at 463 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
 61.  Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). 
 62.  Id. at 2326. 
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B.  Child Pornography 
While the story of the crack–powder disparity is largely a story of stasis (two 
decades of adherence to an extreme and unjustified sentencing structure before 
eventual partial amelioration by the Commission, the courts, and Congress), the 
story of the child pornography Guidelines is a story of radical change. From the 
inception of the Guidelines in 1987, the treatment of child pornography has 
been a one-way ratchet, repeatedly turned by Congress. In a little more than 
two decades, the child pornography Guidelines were substantively revised nine 
times, with each revision either extending the scope of the offense or making 
the penalty harsher.63 In the span of a single decade (from 1997 to 2007), the 
mean sentence of child pornography offenders increased from 20.59-months to 
91.30-months confinement—an increase of 443%.64 Every legislative tool in the 
congressional toolkit was employed: Congress created new crimes, imposed 
mandatory minimum sentences, issued directives to the Commission to increase 
sentences under the Guidelines, and even bypassed the Commission entirely by 
directly legislating changes to the Guidelines. 
The child pornography story does not end with congressional 
reconsideration, as the crack cocaine story did. Rather, most of the resistance to 
the escalation of penalties has come from the courts, with some lesser resistance 
from the Commission. In a comprehensive 2010 survey of federal trial court 
judges conducted by the Sentencing Commission, the Guidelines for child 
pornography were designated as inappropriately high by 70% of the judges for 
possession offenses and 69% of the judges for receipt offenses.65 The only other 
sentences in the same ballpark of judicial disapproval for harshness were the 
crack cocaine penalties.66 In the past few years, a growing number of appellate 
courts have joined individual sentencing judges in taking measures to 
ameliorate the harshness of child pornography sentencing, especially for less-
culpable and less-dangerous offenders. It remains to be seen whether these 
growing judicial defections—and the potential for increased sentencing 
disparities that they portend—will lead Congress to reconsider the structure 
and magnitude of federal child pornography penalties. 
When the Guidelines were first promulgated, simple possession of child 
pornography was not a federal crime. The single relevant Guideline addressed 
 
 63.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, THE HISTORY OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY GUIDELINES 
54 (2009) [hereinafter 2009 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY], available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Research/Research_Projects/Sex_Offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf. 
 64.  See Troy Stabenow, Deconstructing the Myth of Careful Study: A Primer on the Flawed 
Progression of the Child Pornography Guidelines 2 (Jan. 1, 2009) (citing federal statistics), available at 
http://www.fd.org/docs/select-topics---sentencing/child-porn-july-revision.pdf?sfvrsn=4. 
 65.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES, 
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, question 8: Appropriateness of Guideline Ranges (2010), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/Research/Research_Projects/Surveys/20100608_Judge_Survey.pdf. The 
judges gave similar answers regarding the appropriateness of the applicable mandatory minimum 
penalties. See id. at question 1: Mandatory Minimums. 
 66.  See id. at questions 1 & 8. 
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“transporting, receiving, or trafficking” offenses, for which the base offense 
level was thirteen.67 Congress criminalized possession and possession with intent 
to sell child pornography in 199068 and directed the Commission to “amend 
existing guidelines for sentences involving sexual crimes against children . . . so 
that more substantial penalties may be imposed if the Commission determines 
current penalties are inadequate.”69 The Commission responded to this statute 
and directive by formulating a new Guideline setting the base offense level for 
the new offense of possession of child pornography at ten and treating the pre-
existing offenses of transporting and receiving child pornography as analogous 
to possession rather than to trafficking (thus lowering their base offense level 
from thirteen to ten). The Commission described its process of collection and 
analysis of quantitative and qualitative data, including interviews with judges, 
prosecutors, and probation officers.70 The Commission explained that its 
decision to set a lower base level offense for the least serious offenses rested on 
a pattern of judicial downward departures, coupled with the absence of 
government appeals, under the pre-existing Guidelines. This pattern suggested 
that both judges and prosecutors thought that the least serious forms of child 
pornography offenses were being too harshly punished.71 The Commission 
further explained that its decision relied on the fact that “receipt is a logical 
predicate to possession” and the conclusion that “the guideline sentence in such 
cases should not turn on the timing or nature of law enforcement intervention, 
but rather on the gravity of the underlying conduct.”72 The Commission also 
added an enhancement applicable to both possession and trafficking offenses 
for material involving a prepubescent minor or a minor under the age of twelve 
years,73 as well as enhancements applicable only to trafficking offenses for 
distribution of child pornography and for material portraying sadistic, 
masochistic, or violent conduct.74 
Congress was displeased with the Commission’s approach to possession of 
child pornography, especially the decision to treat receipt and transportation as 
analogous to possession, and thus as less serious than trafficking. A letter 
responding to the Commission produced in the House of Representatives noted 
that most child pornography offenders, including trafficking offenders, were 
caught in the act of receiving the material through sting operations, and 
therefore argued that the Commission’s downgrading of receipt was 
misguided.75 In 1991, Congress passed new legislation directing the Commission 
 
 67.  See 2009 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY, supra note 63, at 11. 
 68.  See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647 § 323, 104 Stat. 4789, 4818–19 (1990). 
 69.  Id. § 321. 
 70.  See 2009 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY, supra note 63, at 8. 
 71.  See id. at 21. 
 72.  See id. at 19. 
 73.  See id. at 12. 
 74.  See id. at 16. 
 75.  Id. at 22 (citing 137 CONG. REC. 6740 (1991) (memorandum by House staff in response to 
Sentencing Commission letter inserted into record by Rep. Wolf)). 
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to treat receipt the same as trafficking, and to increase the base offense level for 
trafficking offenses from 13 to 15, and for possession offenses from 10 to 13. 
The Commission, despite its noted objections,76 implemented Congress’s 
directives (as it was required by law to do). 
In 1995, Congress again directed the Commission to raise the base offense 
levels for child pornography offenses across the board by at least two offense 
levels (from 15 to at least 17 for trafficking and from 13 to at least 15 for 
possession) and to add an at least two-level enhancement for the use of a 
computer.77 Congress further directed the Commission to study child 
pornography and child sex offenses and to submit a report to Congress with the 
Commission’s recommendations.78 The Commission complied with Congress’s 
directives but made only the minimum required increases. In its report, the 
Commission explained that its analysis supported an enhancement for the use 
of a computer to solicit participation in the production of child pornography, 
but worried that the general two-level enhancement for any computer use was 
not “finely-tuned” enough to distinguish among quite different levels of 
distribution and culpability.79 
In 1998, Congress again passed legislation directing the Commission to 
increase the severity of the child pornography penalties.80 Congress generally 
directed the Commission to ensure that the guidelines were “appropriately 
severe” as well as “reasonably consistent” with other Sentencing Guidelines.81 
Congress also specifically directed the Commission to promulgate several new 
enhancements and to clarify that “distribution” of child pornography included 
both distribution for monetary remuneration and for a non-pecuniary interest.82 
The clarification directive was significant because it ensured enhancement not 
only for those who sold child pornography, but also for those who traded it for 
other images.83 The Commission complied with Congress’s directives, 
 
 76.  See 2009 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY, supra note 63, at 20–21. Congress also directed two 
new enhancements, one for possession of more than ten items of child pornography, and one for 
trafficking if the defendant engaged in a pattern of sexual abuse of a minor. The Commission noted 
that it did not object to either the pattern-of-abuse enhancement or the base-offense-level increase for 
trafficking from 13 to 15, as these two aspects of Congress’s directives were consistent with the 
Commission’s own recommendations. Id. at 24–25. 
 77.  See Sex Crimes Against Children Prevention Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-71 §§ 2–3, 109 Stat 
774 (1995). 
 78.  See id. § 6. 
 79.  See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SEX OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN: FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING FEDERAL PENALTIES 30 (1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ 
Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Congressional_Testimony_and_Reports/Sex_Offense_Topics/199606_
RtC_Sex_Crimes_Against_Children/199606_RtC_SCAC.PDF. 
 80.  See Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-314, 112 Stat 
2974 (1998).  
 81.  Id. at § 502(b), 112 Stat. 2980. 
 82.  See id. § 506. 
 83.  The development of peer-to-peer file-sharing technology (P2P technology) has engendered a 
split in the federal circuits on the question whether the five-level enhancement for non-pecuniary 
distribution (bartering) of child pornography is supported merely by proof that a defendant had 
installed a file-sharing program on his computer that gave others free access to pornographic images. 
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promulgating a set of graduated enhancements for distribution, including a five-
level enhancement for distribution for non-pecuniary gain.84 
In 2003, Congress passed the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to 
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act (“PROTECT Act”),85 the piece of 
legislation that most displayed Congress’s growing impatience with both the 
Commission and the federal courts.86 Congress directed the Commission to 
substantially reduce the frequency of downward departures from the 
Sentencing Guidelines in general, regardless of the Commission’s view of the 
necessity of such a measure, and prohibited the Commission from promulgating 
any new downward departure Guidelines of any kind for the next two years. 
Moreover, Congress required that sentencing data be reported directly to 
Congress rather than to the Commission. With regard to child pornography 
offenses, Congress passed a five-year mandatory minimum sentence for 
trafficking and receipt offenses, and increased the statutory maximum sentence 
for trafficking and receipt offenses from fifteen to twenty years, and for 
possession offenses from five to ten years.87 In addition, for the first time in the 
history of the Guidelines, Congress bypassed the Commission completely and 
made direct amendments to the Guidelines. Congress added a four-level 
enhancement for possession of sadistic, masochistic, or violent images, and 
enhancements varying between two and five levels based on the number of 
images trafficked or possessed.88 Congress also added a statutory provision that 
required that the Guidelines be “consistent with all pertinent provisions of any 
Federal statute.”89 
In order to conform to the new mandatory minimum sentence and higher 
statutory maxima introduced by the PROTECT Act, the Commission raised the 
base offense levels for trafficking and receipt offenses from 18 to 22, and the 
base offense levels for possession from 15 to 18.90 The Commission conducted a 
prison-impact analysis that revealed that the 2003 amendments required by the 
PROTECT Act would cause average sentences for both trafficking and 
possession to approximately double.91 The Commission attempted to ameliorate 
the impact of the amendments by adding a two-level decrease for offenders 
whose offenses were limited to receipt or solicitation of child pornography and 
 
Compare, e.g., United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2009) (yes, enhancement supported by 
installation of P2P technology), with United States v. Spriggs, 666 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2012) (no, 
enhancement not supported by installation of P2P technology). 
 84.  See 2009 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY, supra note 63, at 33–34. 
 85.  Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). 
 86.  Alan Vinegrad, the former United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, 
described the PROTECT Act as “the most significant effort to marginalize the role of the Sentencing 
Commission in the federal sentencing process since the Commission was created by Congress.” Alan 
Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT. RPTR. 310, 415 (June 2003). 
 87.  PROTECT Act § 103. 
 88.  Id. § 401(i). 
 89.  Id. § 401(k). 
 90.  See 2009 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY, supra note 63, at 46. 
 91.  Id. at 42. 
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who did not intend to distribute or traffic in such material.92 But the 
Commission also decided to count a video as seventy-five images for the 
purposes of Congress’s mandated table of enhancements based on the number 
of images involved. The highest degree of enhancement (five levels) would thus 
be triggered by eight videos.93 
At the conclusion of its 2009 History of the Child Pornography Guidelines, 
the Commission noted that “[s]entencing courts have . . . expressed comment on 
the perceived severity of the child pornography guidelines through increased 
below-guidelines variance and downward departure rates.”94 The pattern of 
judicial defection noted by the Commission has recently accelerated and moved 
beyond the sentencing courts to the federal courts of appeals. In the past two 
years, four federal appellate courts have applied the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Kimbrough95 to hold that, as with the crack cocaine Guidelines, a sentencing 
court may vary from the child pornography Guidelines not only because of an 
individualized determination that they yield an excessive sentence in a 
particular case, but also because of the court’s policy disagreement with them.96 
These courts have reasoned that the extent of Congressional involvement in 
structuring the child pornography Guidelines by legislative fiat may lead 
sentencing courts to reasonably conclude that the Guidelines lack the infusion 
of expertise that warrants judicial deference. Quoting the Kimbrough Court, 
the courts of appeals have argued that the child pornography Guidelines do not 
reflect the Commission’s “exercise of its characteristic institutional role,” which 
requires that it base its determinations on “empirical data and national 
experience.”97 
In addition to criticizing the process by which the child pornography 
Guidelines developed over the years, some of the courts of appeals also 
presented substantive grounds for questioning the Guidelines. First, some 
courts noted the sheer severity of sentencing under the Guidelines. For 
 
 92.  Id. at 48. 
 93.  Id. at 43. In 2008, Congress created a new child pornography offense making it unlawful to 
knowingly produce with intent to distribute or to distribute “child pornography that is an adapted or 
modified depiction of an identifiable minor” (“morphed image”). PROTECT Our Children Act of 
2008, Pub L. No. 110-401, § 304, 122 Stat 4229, 4242–43 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(7) (2006)). 
The Commission responded with amendments incorporating the new offense into the existing child 
pornography Guidelines. See 2009 CHILD PORNOGRAPHY HISTORY at 50–52 
 94.  See id. at 54. 
 95.  See supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.   
 96.  See United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 963 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Dorvee, 616 
F.3d 174,188 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 608–09 (3d Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 89 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 97.  Henderson, 649 F.3d at 963 (quoting Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007)); see 
also id. at 963 n.4 (referencing similar conclusions in the other three circuit courts). Congress’s efforts 
are not required to have the same empirical grounding as the decisions of the Commission, and critics 
have noted how little deliberation attended Congress’s interventions regarding the child pornography 
Guidelines. See, e.g., Stabenow, supra note 64, at 6–7 (discussing lack of debate about 1991 legislation); 
id. at 10–12 (discussing the lack of debate about the 1995 legislation); id. at 20–21 (discussing the lack of 
debate about the 2003 legislation).  
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example, in upholding a below-Guidelines sentence of five years plus three 
years of supervised release for a defendant who had a large collection of child 
pornography on his computer and who had traded such images several times by 
e-mail, the Third Circuit explained that the Guidelines would have yielded an 
“outrageously high” sentencing range of 235 to 293 months.98 The severity of the 
Guidelines is a product of the wide applicability of enhancements that treat run-
of-the-mill cases as highly aggravated. In the current world of nearly universal 
computer access, which allows easy downloading and sharing of images, 
enhancements for “computer use,” “non-pecuniary distribution” (that is, 
trading of images), and offenses involving “more than 600 images” (when one 
video counts as seventy-five images) are examples of enhancements “that are all 
but inherent to the crime of conviction” and ensure sentences near the statutory 
maximum for “ordinary first-time offender[s].”99 As a consequence, the 
Guidelines fail to distinguish between commercial distributors of child 
pornography and defendants whose “core conduct [is] consumption” and who 
present “a very low risk of harm to society.”100 Moreover, the child pornography 
Guidelines are out of sync with the rest of federal sentencing law. As the 
Second Circuit noted, the Guidelines for child pornography are so high that 
they treat an offender who never had any contact with a child more severely 
than the Guideline sentences for repeated sex with a child or for aggravated 
assault with a firearm that results in bodily injury.101 As in the context of crack 
cocaine sentencing, the apparent disproportionality of many child pornography 
sentences has not led to successful constitutional proportionality challenges, 
both because intra- and inter-jurisdiction sentencing comparisons may not be 
considered unless a facial determination of gross disproportionality between 
offense and sentence is first sustained,102 and because the sentences upheld by 
the Supreme Court against Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges have 
themselves been so extreme.103 But some of the courts of appeals have used the 
same sort of proportionality arguments that are unavailing in the constitutional 
context to explain why the child pornography Guidelines do not deserve judicial 
deference under Kimbrough. 
The four circuits that have accepted the Kimbrough argument (that the 
child pornography Guidelines may be rejected by sentencing courts on policy 
grounds) have deployed the argument with varying degrees of aggressiveness. 
The First Circuit did not itself endorse the Kimbrough critique of Congress’s 
intervention in the creation of the child pornography Guidelines. Rather, it held 
 
 98.  Grober, 624 F.3d at 595. 
 99.  Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 186 (reporting Commission statistics showing that, in 2009, 94.8% of child 
pornography sentences involved an image of a prepubescent minor, 97.2% involved a computer, 73.4% 
involved a sadistic, masochistic or violent image, and 63.1% involved 600 or more images).  
 100.  Grober, 624 F.3d at 598 (describing the district court’s findings). 
 101.  See Dorvee, 616 F.3d at 187. 
 102.  See supra notes 46–49 and accompanying text. 
 103.  See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (upholding a twenty-five-years-to-life 
sentence for offense of stealing three golf clubs under California’s “three strikes and you’re out” law).  
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only that a sentencing court must be permitted to vary from the Guidelines on 
such a ground and must be aware that it has such permission. But the First 
Circuit maintained that a sentencing court must also be free to reject a 
defendant’s Kimbrough critique, and indeed, to embrace its opposite: “After 
Kimbrough, the law allows one judge to find that congressional input makes a 
sentence less empirical, and so less appropriate, while another judge may 
reasonably find such input makes the sentence more reflective of democratic 
judgments of culpability, and so more reasonable.”104 The Ninth Circuit did not 
go as far as the First Circuit did in saying that courts were free to treat the 
defects identified in Kimbrough as assets, but the Ninth Circuit emphasized that 
“district courts are not obligated to vary from the child pornography Guidelines 
on policy grounds if they do not have, in fact, a policy disagreement with 
them.”105 The Third Circuit also endorsed the view that district courts are “not 
obligated” to vary from the child pornography Guidelines, but only after a 
lengthy and very critical review of the development of the Guidelines. The 
Third Circuit drew both on the Commission’s 2009 report and the Second 
Circuit’s opinion in Dorvee, and it described these materials as “a wealth of 
resources that have become available since the sentencing in this case” that put 
the sentencing court’s below-Guidelines decision “on even stronger ground.”106 
The Second Circuit in Dorvee went by far the farthest of the four circuits 
when it rejected a within-Guidelines sentence as substantively unreasonable. 
Part of the grounds for the Second Circuit’s reversal of the district court were 
specific rejections of the district court’s views regarding the defendant’s future 
dangerousness, the need for deterrence, and the reasonableness of a statutory 
maximum sentence simply because it fell below the Guidelines range.107 
However, the Second Circuit went on to present a lengthy and scathing critique 
of the child pornography Guideline, describing it as “fundamentally different 
from most.”108 After canvassing both the procedural and substantive flaws of the 
Guideline and deriding its “irrationality,”109 the Dorvee court concluded by 
encouraging district courts “to take seriously the broad discretion they 
possess[,] . . . bearing in mind that they are dealing with an eccentric Guideline 
of highly unusual provenance which, unless carefully applied, can easily 
generate unreasonable results.”110 
 
 104.  United States v. Stone, 575 F.3d 83, 93 (1st Cir. 2009). The First Circuit added a “coda” to its 
decision upholding the sentencing court’s rejection of the defendant’s Kimbrough argument: “[W]e 
wish to express our view that the sentencing guidelines at issue are in our judgment harsher than 
necessary. . . . Were we collectively sitting as the district court, we would have used our Kimbrough 
power to impose a somewhat lower sentence.” Id. at 97. 
 105.  United States v. Henderson, 649 F.3d 955, 964 (9th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added). 
 106.  United States v. Grober, 624 F.3d 592, 609 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 107.  See United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d. 174, 183–84 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 108.  Id. at 184. 
 109.  Id. at 187. 
 110.  Id. at 188. 
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Recently, two circuits have pushed back against this wave of appellate 
criticism of the child pornography Guidelines. In late 2011, the Fifth Circuit 
held that a sentence within the Guidelines range for child pornography offenses 
is entitled to a presumption of reasonableness on appeal.111 Directly responding 
to the Second Circuit’s Dorvee opinion, the Fifth Circuit wrote, “Empirically 
based or not, the Guidelines remain the Guidelines. It is for the Commission to 
alter or amend them. . . . [W]e will not reject a Guidelines provision as 
‘unreasonable’ or ‘irrational’ simply because it is not based on empirical data 
and even if it leads to some disparities in sentencing.”112 Less than a month later, 
in early 2012, the Sixth Circuit followed suit, holding that a deep downward 
variance from the Guidelines range for possession of child pornography was 
substantively unreasonable.113 The trial court had imposed one night in jail and 
ten years of supervised release for the sixty-seven-year-old defendant, rather 
than a sentence in the Guidelines range of 63- to 78-months imprisonment. The 
Sixth Circuit reversed and joined the Fifth in directly repudiating the reasoning 
of Dorvee and other appellate decisions relying on Kimbrough to authorize 
rejection of the child pornography Guidelines. But the Sixth Circuit went even 
further, affirmatively defending the Guidelines as reasonable because of (rather 
than in spite of) Congress’s direct, non-expert, and non-empirical intervention: 
“Congress can marginalize the Commission all it wants: Congress created it. 
Indeed it is normally a constitutional virtue, rather than vice, that Congress 
exercises its power directly, rather than hand it off to an unelected commission. 
The Constitution is fundamentally a democratic document, not a technocratic 
one.”114 
This profound disagreement among the federal appellate courts guarantees 
that there will be an increase—probably a substantial one—in sentencing 
disparities among child pornography offenders, depending on whether they are 
sentenced in circuits that strongly advise, permit, or forbid sentencing judges to 
reject the applicable Guidelines. The increasing sentencing disparities in the 
child pornography context (and the substantial judicial criticisms of the 
Guidelines that generated such disparities) have evoked concern from 
individual federal judges,115 the ABA,116 and the Sentencing Commission itself, 
 
 111.  See United States v. Miller, 665 F.3d. 114 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 112.  Id. at 121. 
 113.  See United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 114.  Id. at 762. 
 115.  See, e.g., United States v. Stern, 590 F. Supp. 2d 945 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (“[O]ne would be hard 
pressed to find a consistent set of principles to explain exactly why some federal child porn defendants 
face decades in federal prison, some face many years in federal prison, while others only end up facing 
months.”) (quoting Douglas A. Berman, Is There an Ivy-Leaguer Exception to Federal Child Porn 
Charges?, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (Oct. 22, 2008, 7:33 AM), http://sentencing.typepad.com/ 
sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/10/is-there-an-ivy.html). 
 116.  See ABA Criminal Justice Section, Resolution 105A (April 2011) (urging the Sentencing 
Commission to review the child pornography Guidelines, passed by the ABA House of Delegates at its 
2011 annual meeting), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ 
criminal_justice/2011a_resolution_105a.authcheckdam.pdf.  
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which held a public hearing on the child pornography Guidelines in February 
2012.117 Whether this concern will prompt reform by the Commission or 
Congress (akin to the Fair Sentencing Act in the crack cocaine context) remains 
to be seen. 
III 
LESSONS 
What lessons can other countries draw from these dual stories of stasis and 
change in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines of the United States? If the stories 
are driven by the distinctive politics, law, and institutional structures of 
contemporary America, then perhaps nothing. If, however, the stories reflect 
some more universal challenges of guiding sentencing discretion, then perhaps 
they can be useful. Because both conditions are true to some extent, I will try to 
tease apart the distinctive from the more universal and to reflect upon both 
negative and positive lessons. 
A.  Distinctive Politics, Law, and Institutions 
The first obvious caveat in drawing lessons from the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines is that they are, well, federal, and thus they reflect the distinctive 
role that the federal government plays in American law enforcement. Unlike 
most other countries (even ones with federal systems), the United States 
allocates the lion’s share of criminal law enforcement authority to its federal 
units, the individual states. Thus, the institutions of federal criminal law 
enforcement have sole or primary authority only in the relatively small arena of 
distinctively federal concerns; the federal government shares authority for 
everything else with state and local law enforcement. Drug and child 
pornography offenses fall squarely within this area of shared authority. One 
consequence of this distinctive institutional arrangement is that both federal 
criminal lawmakers (Congress) and federal prosecutors operate under a 
somewhat different set of incentives than state and local lawmakers and 
prosecutors, or than their national counterparts in other countries. Congress 
and federal prosecutors do not have primary responsibility for responding to 
the bulk of ordinary crime, and thus criminal law enforcement and corrections 
form a much smaller part of the federal budget than of state budgets, or the 
budgets of other countries. As a result, both Congress and federal prosecutors 
are less constrained by the regulating effects of scarcity. If they misallocate 
resources—spending too much to prosecute relatively low-level offenders—
there will be fewer budgetary repercussions and less public outcry than in a 
state system, or any other system that is the “front line” of criminal law 
enforcement. Similarly, the federal government’s limited role in criminal justice 
leads it to legislate in particular areas in something of a vacuum, without the 
 
 117.  The Sentencing Commission’s agenda for its public hearing on the child pornography 
Guidelines is available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legislative_and_Public_Affairs/Public_Hearings_and_ 
Meetings/20120215-16/Notice_15.pdf. 
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context and trade-offs with which state legislatures (and other national 
legislatures) are familiar. Consequently, American-style criminal justice 
federalism often leads Congress “to support legislation of the ‘feel-good, do-
something’ variety rather than to seek out the most cost-effective way to 
address a particular problem.”118 
In addition to the distinctive politics of American federalism, there is the 
distinctive politics of American politics. American political institutions are 
structured in a way that tends to highlight the salience of criminal justice issues. 
The two-party, winner-takes-all American electoral system, in contrast to the 
multi-party parliamentary system in place in the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere, promotes single-issue campaigns when there is a single issue (like 
crime) that has wide appeal to “floating, median voters.”119 American 
institutions are also distinctively populist—not only in their disaggregation of 
power to state and local units, but also in the multitude of institutional channels 
for popular political influence (such as the “primary” system for selecting party 
candidates, and state referenda and initiatives such as the Washington state 
ballot initiative system described by Kate Stith in her contribution to this 
symposium).120 Moreover, criminal justice is special even within American 
political populism, as there are a number of special institutional measures to 
ensure popular participation in criminal justice administration (such as the 
election of most prosecutors and judges, and lay participation in grand and petit 
juries).121 This distinctive sensitivity to populist influence renders the American 
political and criminal justice systems especially prone to over-reaction to 
discrete events and to the influence of “moral panics”—such as those that 
surrounded both crack cocaine and child pornography in the past few decades.122 
These distinctive features of American politics and institutions proved 
hospitable to the potent influence of three different, though overlapping, 
political movements in the United States. The first, which started in the 1960s, 
was the Republican party’s so-called “Southern strategy”—its conscious 
attempt to use crime as a coded racial appeal to Southern democrats angered by 
the civil rights movement of the 1950s and ‘60s.123 The second, which began the 
following decade, was the victims’ rights movement, an organized and powerful 
 
 118.  Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1276, 1303 
(2005); see also id. at 1299–1312 (surveying the various ways in which American federalism shapes 
Congressional law-making in the sentencing context). 
 119.  NICOLA LACEY, THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND PUNISHMENT IN 
CONTEMPORARY DEMOCRACIES 69 (2008). 
 120.  See Kate Stith, Sentencing Guidelines in Washington State, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 
2013 at 105, 122–24. 
 121.  See Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, 81 OR. L. REV. 97, 
114–20 (2002) (exploring features of American political populism and criminal justice populism). 
 122.  See generally MICHAEL H. TONRY, THINKING ABOUT CRIME: SENSE AND SENSIBILITY IN 
AMERICAN PENAL CULTURE (2004) (describing how moral panics have led to unprecedented and 
unnecessary harshness in American criminal justice over the past several decades). 
 123.  See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF 
COLOR-BLINDNESS 43–44 (2010). 
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movement to promote the interests and influence of crime victims in the 
criminal process.124 The third, which began in the 1980s, was the rise to power of 
the religious right, which has led to the formidable political influence of first 
Jerry Falwell’s “Moral Majority” and then Pat Robertson’s “Christian 
Coalition,” from the Reagan years onward.125 These three political 
developments helped to promote both the political candidates and the political 
agenda that undergirded the War on Drugs (and the war on crack cocaine in 
particular), as well as the almost equivalent “war” on child sex offenders (which 
includes child pornography offenders).126 
Finally, the distinctive mode of constitutional regulation of criminal justice 
in the United States has prevented the courts from serving as a counter-
majoritarian check on the political excesses of American penal populism. Since 
the “criminal procedure revolution” of the 1960s, when the Warren Court 
incorporated most of the provisions of the federal constitutional Bill of Rights 
to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, American constitutional regulation of criminal justice has been almost 
entirely procedural rather than substantive.127 The granting of increased 
constitutional procedural rights to criminal defendants created incentives for 
legislatures to empower prosecutors at the plea-bargaining negotiating table 
with more-expansive criminal prohibitions and more-severe sentences.128 At the 
same time, the Supreme Court’s abdication of constitutional authority to review 
the substantive proportionality or distributional equity of punishment removed 
any judicial check on this “pathological politics”129 of crime on the legislative 
side. 
To the extent that these distinctive features of American politics, 
institutions, and law drove the two Guidelines failures that are my topic, these 
stories are useful to other countries only to the extent that they have some 
parallel features in their own systems. Perhaps in Israel, the influence of the 
“religious right” (albeit of a different religion) or the linking of the crime issue 
with disadvantaged racial, ethnic, or religious groups (albeit of different groups) 
 
 124.  See generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, VICTIMS IN THE WAR ON CRIME: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF VICTIMS’ RIGHTS (2002) (chronicling and critiquing the victims’ rights movement in the 
United States); see also History of Victims’ Rights, NATIONAL CRIME VICTIM LAW INSTITUTE, 
http://law.lclark.edu/centers/national_crime_victim_law_institute/about_ncvli/history_of_victims_rights/ 
(last visited November 26, 2012) (dating the movement’s origins to 1973). 
 125.  See generally WILLIAM MARTIN, WITH GOD ON OUR SIDE: THE RISE OF THE RELIGIOUS 
RIGHT IN AMERICA (1996) (chronicling the twentieth century’s rise of the religious right, with an 
emphasis on the rise of the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition). 
 126.  See generally Corey Rayburn Yung, The Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 
HARVARD C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2010) (elaborating on the parallels between the War on Drugs and 
the new “war” on sex offenders). 
 127.  See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 209–10 (2011) 
(calling for greater constitutional regulation of substantive criminal law).  
 128.  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 537 
(2001) (describing legislative incentives to expand the criminal law to empower prosecutors and reduce 
the costs of criminal prosecution). 
 129.  Id. 
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may offer some loose resonances. However, although the distinctive features 
canvassed above are clearly operative in the two Guidelines stories I recount, 
they do not exhaust the factors contributing to these failures. I thus turn now to 
some more generalizable aspects of the Guidelines stories. 
B.  General Challenges of Guiding Sentencing Discretion 
The distinctive politics of the United States described above played a larger 
role than it might otherwise have done in the overarching Guidelines story 
because of contestable institutional choices in the shaping of the Federal 
Sentencing Commission and its relationship to Congress. This is the first 
generalizable challenge for any system that seeks to constrain judicial discretion 
based on some form of expert set-points or guidelines—the challenge of 
insulating expertise from the political sphere. In the federal Guidelines story, 
Congress kept tight control over the Sentencing Commission, giving itself both 
the power to issue specific directives to the Commission and the power to 
directly legislate changes in the Guidelines. As time went on, Congress further 
arrogated power to itself, not only proliferating mandatory minimum sentences 
but also temporarily stripping the Commission of the power to create new 
downward departure Guidelines, demanding the reporting of sentencing data 
directly to itself rather than to the Commission, and specifically requiring that 
the Guidelines be consistent with all Congressional legislation as part of the 
PROTECT Act of 2003.130 One can imagine alternative choices that would have 
promoted greater deference to the expertise of the Commission (more on this 
below). The basic point is that a central element in stories of failure recounted 
above is the erosion of deference to expertise and reliance instead on ever-
more-polarized politics. Creating and maintaining a healthy balance between 
expertise and political accountability is a key challenge for any guided 
sentencing regime. 
A second general challenge that controlling judicial discretion through 
guidelines inevitably confronts is the temptation to count most what can easily 
be counted. In the cocaine context (indeed, in the entire drug context), the 
temptation was to count the weight of the drug at issue, because it was infinitely 
divisible on a calibrated scale and allowed for easily calculated triggers for 
differentiated penalties. It was this focus on weight that gave birth to the 
troubling 100-to-1 crack-to-powder ratio. Similarly, the number of images 
possessed or transmitted exerted the same siren pull and played a similarly 
problematic role in the context of child pornography offenses. The central 
problem is that the most easily calculable metrics often place too much 
emphasis on the wrong things—the weight of drugs and the number of 
pornographic images are very weak proxies for the culpability and 
dangerousness of offenders. But accounting for all of the myriad contributors to 
culpability and dangerousness is difficult, if not impossible—and much harder 
 
 130.  See supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. 
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to monitor for disparities. Hence the attraction of the easy metric, and once 
such a metric is in place, it tends to dominate a judge’s decisionmaking process, 
even if that process ostensibly includes the myriad other “softer” factors. Dan 
Richman, in his contribution to this conference, explains that financial loss plays 
the role of attractive-but-problematic metric in the white collar context; he sums 
up this problem beautifully, noting that “there is a substantial likelihood that a 
preliminary quantifiable task will distort the larger qualitative project in which 
it is embedded.”131 
A related temptation in formulating sentencing guidelines is to count most 
what can easily be caught. We see this clearly in the child pornography context, 
where one big issue of contention between the Commission and Congress was 
the proper treatment of the crime of “receiving” child pornography. The 
Commission reasoned that “receiving” pornography (through the mail or 
electronically) is tantamount to “possessing” it in terms of culpability and 
dangerousness and thus should be treated similarly in terms of punishment. But 
Congress insisted that receipt be punished more than possession (on a par with 
“trafficking”) because it learned from federal law enforcement that many 
defendants were arrested in sting operations at the moment of receipt, so that 
maintaining high penalties for receipt would make prosecution easier.132 This 
dispute illustrates the more general problem of identifying—and adhering to—a 
set of coherent and defensible principles in formulating the ordinal ranking of 
penalties in a guidelines scheme. 
The lack of a coherent and defensible rationale for the structure of the 
cocaine and child pornography Guidelines illuminates a deeper problem 
endemic to guidelines sentencing in general. The birth of guided discretion (in 
sentencing or elsewhere) is always attended by hopes that the troubling 
disparities permitted by unbridled discretion will be reduced. What is not 
always fully realized is that the unjustified disparities (as well as unjustified 
uniformities) that arise from rule-based sentencing can be just as pernicious as 
those that are produced by discretion, but they can also be both less visible and 
(even when visible) more difficult to change. The stories of the cocaine and 
child pornography Guidelines are, if nothing else, testaments to the “stickiness” 
of bad ideas in guiding sentencing discretion. In both contexts, despite ample 
evidence casting doubt on the wisdom of the Guidelines at issue—including 
criticism from a substantial majority of the none-too-liberal federal bench—
 
 131.  Daniel Richman, Federal White Collar Sentencing in the United States: A Work in Progress,  76 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1, 2013 at 53, 70. The fact that “softer” sentencing factors are often not 
amenable to easy calibration also leads to a tendency to simply exclude them from any Guidelines 
calculus. As federal judge Marvin Frankel noted, “Part of the pattern of excessive severity is the 
Commission’s relatively cursory and meachanical handling of mitigating factors [in the federal 
Guidelines].” Marvin E. Frankel, Keynote Address, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative 
Collaboration, 101 YALE L.J. 2043, 2047 (1992).  
 132.  See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. The fact that the vast majority of federal 
criminal cases are disposed of by plea bargaining rather than by trial increases legislative willingness to 
enhance the prosecutor’s bargaining position by raising penalties for easily provable offenses even 
when they are not the most serious ones. 
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change has been either very slow or non-existent. As one commentator has 
quipped, “‘[S]orry’ seems to be the hardest word for legislators to say when it 
comes to the recalibration of criminal penalties.”133 Moreover, in a guidelines 
system, legislative impulses to demonstrate “toughness” on a particular kind of 
offense generally lead to across-the-board increases in the sentences of all 
offenders in that general category, as the whole scale of such offenses is 
recalibrated. In a non-guidelines system, it is easier for legislatures to merely 
raise the statutory maximum in a symbolic gesture that sends a public message, 
while still allowing for prosecutorial and judicial discretion to keep sentences at 
reasonable levels. This difference means increased harshness in a guidelines 
regime generally will be not only “stickier” but also more pervasive in effect.134 
Thus, we can glean from the two stories of failure three general types of 
challenges that any guidelines scheme must face—challenges that can be 
grouped under the headings of “lack of insulation from politics,” “unprincipled 
metrics,” and “resistance of rules to change.” The harder question, to which I 
now turn, is whether there are any positive strategies available to meet these 
challenges. 
C.  Positive Prescriptions 
With regard to the problem of inadequate insulation of expertise from 
politics, one can take the American experience and start to imagine different 
institutional arrangements. It is not difficult to think of choices that Congress 
might have made to render deviations from the Sentencing Commission’s 
decisions more costly, without abdicating its power to overrule the Commission 
through legislation. For example, as a substantive matter, Congress could have 
kept the power to veto the Commission’s proposed amendments to the 
Guidelines without giving itself the power to issue specific directives or to 
directly legislate changes in the Guidelines. Or, Congress could have imposed 
greater procedural requirements on itself as a precondition to issuing directives 
or directly legislating Guidelines changes (requirements of greater study and 
more thorough hearings, for example), or it could have invited the Commission 
to revisit Congressionally mandated changes after a certain period of data 
collection and study. Or, Congress could have formalized a rule similar to what 
the federal courts have begun to generate on their own—that in an advisory 
Guidelines system, specific Guidelines are worthy of judicial deference only 
when they reflect expert judgment and empirical support. Such rules limiting its 
own power, of course, are always revocable by Congress, but the “ground rules” 
that Congress sets for itself ab initio are important not only as rules, but also as 
crucial aspects of a culture of deference to expertise—a culture that grew 
progressively weaker in the criminal justice sphere over the lifetime of the 
federal Guidelines. 
 
 133.  Graham, Sorry Seems to Be the Hardest Word, supra note 14, at 769. 
 134.  I am indebted to Yoav Sapir for this point. 
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Alternatively, one could approach the problem of lack of political deference 
to expert choices from a different angle and attempt to promote the credibility 
of expert choices by involving the legislative branch in their formulation. If 
there were mandated legislative representation on the Sentencing Commission, 
it might “politicize” the Commission’s work even further. But, conversely, it 
might have the effect of creating greater legislative “buy-in” and thus deference 
to the work of the Commission when that work was reviewed on Capitol Hill. 
This latter choice is not necessarily incompatible with the proposals above to 
promote greater political deference to expertise. The point is to generate 
institutional arrangements—and, beyond the formal arrangements, an 
expectation and a culture—that promote deference to expertise in the political 
sphere. 
On the issue of problematic metrics, one could address it directly by 
requiring penalty metrics to conform to some general sentencing principles in a 
coherent and defensible way. But this simple and sensible idea, experience 
shows, may lie beyond the realm of the possible. The original Federal 
Sentencing Commission was simply unable to agree on more than the most 
general principles and thus settled for metrics that, for most offenses, were 
designed to reproduce aggregate past sentencing practices.135 Moreover, the 
ritualistic intonation of the purposes of Guidelines sentencing that now 
precedes every advisory application of the Guidelines (even those that are 
diametrically opposed to one another) suggests that there is too much room to 
roam in application at the higher levels of purposive generality (while there is 
not enough agreement on purposes at lower levels of generality). A better 
response to the tendency of guidelines systems to count (or overly emphasize) 
the wrong things in formulating its metrics is to develop a robust set of 
mitigating factors that can negate “false positive” readings produced by rigid or 
inaccurate metrics. For example, in the child pornography context, a mitigating 
factor that allowed a substantial downward departure for clinical evidence 
supporting a low likelihood of sexual contact with a child in the future would go 
a long way toward surmounting the unwarranted assumptions built into the 
significant enhancements for possessing a large number of images, and for the 
violence of the images, and for using a computer. 
As for the way in which disparities can be generated by rules as much as by 
discretion, the best response here may be prevention—in the form of required 
predictive analysis of the racial (or ethnic or religious) impact of a proposed 
guideline scheme, or a later amendment to such a scheme. This kind of 
prevention can be coupled with the post hoc commitment to “sunshine”—
continued required data collection on racial (or ethnic or religious) disparities. 
In both the preventive and post hoc stages, data production must be tied to a 
commitment to respond and to modify guidelines that produce unwarranted 
disparities along these dimensions. Of course, controversy will always attend 
 
 135.  See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which 
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 17 (1988). 
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the question whether disparities are “unwarranted” (as it did in the crack–
powder disparity context). But starting and maintaining such a conversation, 
however controversial, is the first necessary step in addressing the disparities 
that may be introduced by a more rule-based sentencing system. 
Finally, the “stickiness” and resistance to change that have accompanied the 
two American stories of Guidelines failures may be a product primarily of 
dysfunctional American politics. But to the extent that the failures of a guided 
sentencing system can become entrenched even absent such politics, the best 
remedy may be to keep open and to take seriously channels of feedback, 
especially from sentencing judges. It is American federal sentencing judges, 
more than any other institutional actors, who questioned both the cocaine and 
the child pornography Guidelines. Had they been heard and heeded sooner, 
legislative change on the cocaine front may have come much more quickly (and 
more extensively), and ad hoc defection on the child pornography front would 
not be the order of the day.136 In a different vein, explicitly connecting 
guidelines formation to budgetary constraints or prison capacity can also be a 
way to prevent excessively harsh guidelines from continuing in perpetuity, as 
some state guidelines schemes have done within the United States.137 
* * * 
Guided discretion of judicial sentencing is not bound to fail—or at least not 
bound to fail as disastrously as it did in the American cocaine and child 
pornography contexts. Close attention to these two stories of failure offers 
some answers to the questions of what contributed to these particular failures 
and how generally such types of failures might be averted in the future. In law, 
as in life, role models are always helpful, but perhaps even more helpful are 
negative role models who demonstrate what not to do. I hope that the two 
examples canvassed here start a helpful conversation in this latter vein. 
 
 
 136.  American trial juries, even when they do not have sentencing power, can also be a source of 
such feedback through their nullification power, though federal sentencing judges have been 
unsuccessful in attempting to harness this power. See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (overruling the district court’s holding that it should have informed the trial jury of the 
sentencing consequences in a child pornography case); United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 391 F.3d 86 (2d 
Cir. 2004) (holding that the defendant had no legal entitlement to a jury instruction the regarding 
sentencing consequences in child pornography case). 
 137.  For example, Minnesota pioneered the routine and rigorous use of resource-impact 
assessments to guide the formulation of sentencing guidelines, a practice followed to varying degrees by 
many other states. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and 
Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1216 (2005) (“Arguably the most important 
innovation of state guidelines systems, and the key to their survival and effectiveness, is their use of 
prison and other resource impact assessments.”). 
